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1 Introduction
This paper attempts to offer a fresh perspective on one of the oldest and most important questions in
economics: why are some nations rich and others poor? We will draw on a familiar answer, namely the
potential role of multiple equilibria or ‘poverty traps’, but our main contribution is not a theoretical one,
nor a simple extension of previous work. Instead, we address what is probably the central weakness of
this literature, namely its failure to explore the practical relevance of the poverty trap idea.
Our proposed solution involves several innovations. We develop a method for calibrating models
with multiple equilibria. We apply this technique to a simple two sector model, and calibrate the model
for 127 countries. The calibration exercise allows us to infer, under the maintained assumptions of
our model, whether each country is in a low output or high output equilibrium. We can then examine
the international prevalence of poverty traps, quantify their consequences for productivity, and even
identify events in the data that may correspond to equilibrium switching. We can also shed new light
on several unresolved debates in the growth literature, including the role of total factor productivity in
explaining international differences in living standards. Overall, the implications are suf¿ciently rich
that our approach may be a useful way forward for research on aggregate development.
Although calibration is an established technique in other areas of macroeconomics, we believe that
its application to poverty traps is new to this paper. In pursuing this application, we also develop a
method for calibrating models of multiple equilibria that may have wider application. The paper
demonstrates how to exploit the multiplicity property in a way that greatly simpli¿es the calibration
exercise. Given also the relatively simple form of our two sector model, our approach requires only a
minimal set of parameter assumptions and remarkably little data. This is a considerable strength in any
1exercise that brings a speci¿c model of aggregate development to the cross-country data.
Before we describe the approach in more detail, it is worth setting out the reasons that models of
multiple equilibria continue to be of interest. The central argument is that the gulf between rich and
poor countries does not originate simply in differences in characteristics like those of geography or
institutions. Instead, there is a multiplicity in possible outcomes for any given set of characteristics.
A country may be trapped in an equilibrium with low living standards when, in principle at least, an
alternative and superior equilibrium is also feasible.
The concept of a poverty trap is among the oldest, most inÀuential, and most controversial ideas
in development economics. It has been discussed by a long list of distinguished economists, includ-
ing Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Nurkse (1953), Myrdal (1957), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989),
Matsuyama (1991) and Krugman (1995) among many others.1 Recent formal modelling has helped
to capture some of the central ideas using coherent theoretical frameworks. This seems worthwhile
because the underlying ideas retain a powerful hold on our intuitions about development, and appear
in many informal accounts of the growth process. For example, a common implication of models with
multiplicity is the need for a critical minimum effort or ‘Big Push’ to bring about industrialization and
development. These models can also yield transitions of unusually rapid growth driven by ‘cumulative
causation’ (or a virtuous circle) as the economy moves from one equilibrium to another. In this sense,
the models can capture the popular idea of take-off into sustained growth.
Despite the intuitive appeal of these ideas and their continuing prominence within the literature, it
would perhaps be fair to say that formal models have not ful¿lled their early promise. The reason is not
hard to ¿nd: theoretical work has rarely generated distinctive implications that can be tested against
the available data.2 Despite the surge of interest in empirical growth research since the late 1980s, only
a few papers have acknowledged the possibility of non-uniqueness. Conventional regression methods
are not well suited to the analysis of multiple equilibria, and are likely to yield misleading results in
this context (Durlauf and Johnson 1995, Durlauf and Quah 1999).
It will clearly be dif¿cult to test models of multiple equilibria, and the aim of this paper is less am-
bitious.3 Our main contribution is to use calibration to address questions that are typically unanswered
1Our list emphasizes models in the “Big Push” tradition, often based on two sectors. For more general analysis of poverty
traps, see Azariadis (1996, 2001). It is also worth noting that the possibility of multiple equilibria is discussed informally
even in Solow’s (1956) original exposition of the neoclassical growth model.
2Theoretical emphasis on multiple equilibria is sometimes justi¿ed with brief allusions to countries which display very
different living standards, even when apparently similar in most other respects. Unfortunately, testing this claim in more
rigorous terms is not straightforward, and has rarely been attempted.
3We do not wish to imply that such models could never be tested. In the long term, it is possible that formal tests could be
developed based on, for example, regime-switching models. As we emphasize later in the paper, our version of calibration
2by purely theoretical work. For example, by calibrating a speci¿c model, we can quantify the output
effect of moving from one equilibrium to another. That allows some insight into the potential explana-
tory power of the model, and we can start to assess whether the disparity between low income and high
income outcomes is large enough to help in understanding the vast international differences in living
standards.
The paper will show that even a relatively simple model of multiplicity has rich empirical impli-
cations. As noted earlier, under the maintained assumptions of our model, we can use the available
data to infer whether a given country is in a low output or high output equilibrium. These equilibrium
assignments will be sensitive to parameter choices, and we explore the conditions on parameters under
which a large or small number of the world’s countries might be regarded as in a ‘poverty trap’ at a
speci¿c point in time. We can also compare the current distribution with a counterfactual one, gener-
ated by assuming that each country is in its high output equilibrium. Hence we can start to quantify the
potential contribution of multiplicity to the observed cross-country variation in levels of income.
The exercise sheds light on other questions as well. Much recent work has investigated the extent
and nature of international differences in total factor productivity (TFP). One motivation for this work
is the argument that the costless transfer of technology across national borders should largely eliminate
such differences. Yet aggregate ‘levels accounting’ exercises indicate that TFP differences across coun-
tries are large, and account for a substantial fraction of the variation in the output data. An approach
based on multiplicity can potentially reconcile these two apparently conÀicting positions. The reason
is that, since models of multiple equilibria imply several possible output levels for ¿xed stocks of labor
and capital, they can provide an explanation for international differences in aggregate TFP even when
countries use the same technology.
The paper also examines the likelihood of switching between equilibria. We calibrate the model
for two points in time, 1965 and 1988. Taken at face value, our calibration results indicate that some
countries switched from a low output to a high output equilibrium over this period. By trying to isolate
patterns in the cross-country data that could reÀect transitions between equilibria, we can suggest which
countries might repay detailed study when analyzing multiplicity in more depth.4 This also means
that we can relate our calibration results to nonparametric studies of the world income distribution,
including the transition matrix approach associated with the work of Quah (1993).
These are ambitious goals, and some quali¿cation is required. We do not use calibration to attempt
should be seen as a complementary approach, and is not a substitute for formal testing.
4For example, Rodrik (1995, 1996) has argued that the East Asian miracle may have depended on a state-assisted process
of overcoming coordination failure, and a consequent shift between two different equilibrium output levels. A calibrated
model could offer additional insight into the validity of this argument.
3to predict or match the patterns observed in the cross-country data. Instead, our aim is to learn more
about the properties of a speci¿c model, and its potential for explaining certain features of the data
under plausible parameter assumptions. We hope to show that the insights gained from calibration are
suf¿ciently rich to indicate that it provides a useful complement to theory. Nevertheless, one must be
careful to remain agnostic on the validity of any particular model, and we acknowledge that some of
our ¿ndings are inevitably speculative.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the model and provides some intuition for
the presence of multiple equilibria. Section 3 introduces our calibration strategy. Section 4 provides a
brief description of the data we use and discusses the main parameter assumptions. Sections 5 through
7 present our main results. Section 5 focuses on our main research question – posed in the title of
the paper – namely, how much of the worldwide dispersion in income levels can multiple equilibria
explain? Section 6 looks at the implications of the model for understanding aggregate TFP differences
across countries. Section 7 relates our results to the nonparametric studies of the world distribution
of income associated with Quah (1993) and others. Section 8 examines the possible sensitivity of the
results to alternative parameter assumptions. Finally, section 9 provides a summary and conclusions.
One further note is in order. Since the approach is a new one, we lay out our ideas and methods in
some detail, in the interests of clarity. This, combined with the richness of the model’s implications,
means that the paper is necessarily long. The more technical aspects of the model and the calibration
exercise are described in the appendices.
2T h e m o d e l
The model that we calibrate is probably the simplest that generates multiplicity in an interesting way,
while remaining rich enough to take to the data. There are two sectors, agriculture and non-agriculture,
and our key assumption is to posit externalities in the non-agricultural sector. The external effect means
that we can assume constant returns to scale for individual ¿rms, but allow increasing returns to scale
at the level of the sector as a whole. As Romer (1986) showed in the context of aggregate growth
models, the externality assumption can be a useful way to incorporate increasing returns in a general
equilibrium context. For precisely this reason, two sector models with a sector-speci¿c externality have
a long history in trade theory, and form one of the canonical approaches to the analysis of multiple
equilibria.5
5In the theoretical literature on poverty traps, the presence of agglomeration economies arises from explicitly modelled
microfoundations, such as a division of labor process (see for example Rodriguez-Clare 1996 or Rodrik 1996). Here we
4We start by sketching a very basic model, simpler than the one we calibrate. This simple model
helps to convey the underlying ideas behind the multiplicity result, and we will return to it later, in
explaining our calibration strategy. In the simple model, there is just one factor of production, labor.
There are diminishing returns to labor in agriculture and, due to an externality, increasing returns to
labor in non-agriculture. We assume that the relative price of the agricultural good is ¿xed. We also
assume that labor is paid its private marginal product in both sectors.
The agricultural production function is:
\@ @ D@O￿
@
where 3 ?!?4. For non-agriculture, we introduce a simple form of externality, namely that the
output of each individual ¿rm is an increasing function of total non-agricultural employment. Using m
to index the ¿rms, we have:
\?￿ @ D?O?￿Ob
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where \?￿ and O?￿ are the output and employment of ¿rm l and O? is total employment in this sector.
The externality parameter is greater than zero +A3,. Aggregating over ¿r m sw et h e nh a v e :
\? @ D?O￿nb
?
The ¿rms set employment levels O?￿ without taking into account their effect on total employment
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This equation will usually yield two solutions for the agricultural employment share, d,w h e r e3 ?
d?4. This is the multiplicity result. The underlying intuition is that, due to the externality, the labor
demand curve in non-agriculture is upward sloping.6 Hence it may intersect more than once with the
downward sloping labor demand curve in agriculture. When we turn to the more complex model that
is the basis for our empirical work, we provide a more formal treatment of non-uniqueness.
concentrate on a simpler model which captures the same basic ideas.
6Note that the simple one-factor model is essentially similar to models analyzed by Panagariya (1981) and Ethier (1982b),
both of whom provide richer intuition for the presence of multiple equilibria.
5The more complex model we calibrate retains the same basic structure, but introduces two addi-
tional factors, land and physical capital. Land is used only in agriculture, capital in both sectors. One
advantage of introducing capital is that we can now make the more plausible assumption that returns to
labor are diminishing, while retaining the implication of multiple equilibria, under the assumption that
capital is perfectly mobile between sectors.
We now describe the full model in more detail. Essentially it is a general equilibrium model of
production, as commonly used in trade theory. We consider a small open economy in which all goods
are traded, but which is closed to international Àows of capital and labor. Aggregate output is the sum
of agricultural output, \@, and non-agricultural output, \?:
\ @ \@ . s\? (1)
where s is the relative price of the non-agricultural good. Our assumptions about trade ensure that s is
¿x e db yw o r l dp r i c e s  appropriate choice of units for output allows the price to be eliminated from the
equations that follow.
The model assumes that all factors of production are fully employed and that factors receive their
private marginal products. We treat the agricultural sector as made up of a large number of landown-
ers and perfectly competitive, pro¿t-maximizing ¿rms.7 These ¿rms produce using a Cobb-Douglas
technology that has constant returns to physical capital, land and labor, where land is rented from the
landowners, and all ¿rms pay the same factor costs. Under these assumptions we can restrict attention
to a representative ¿rm, and write total agricultural output as:
\@ @^ N  N?`k^U`q^D@k+O  O?,`￿3k3q (2)
Where N, O,a n dU refer respectively to the aggregate (economy-wide) stock of capital, the total labor
force, and a ¿xed quantity of land. For the sake of our later empirical work on productivity differences,
we are also allowing the effectiveness of labor to be augmented by an index of human capital, k.
Labor-augmenting technology is indexed by D@.
In the non-agricultural sector, output for ¿rm m @4 ==M in non-agriculture is given by:
\?￿ @ i +N?￿>D ?kO?￿,y+\?, (3)
@ i +n>D?k,y+\?,O?￿
wherei+=,exhibitsconstantreturnstoscale, n isthecapital-laborratio, andkisanindexofaveragehu-
man capital. The second line follows from the use of constant returns technology by pro¿t-maximizing
7A natural extension would be to model the decisions of rural households rather than ¿rms.
6¿rms. As is standard, the assumption that all ¿rms within this sector pay the same factor costs, and use
the same technology, ensures that all ¿rms choose the same capital-labor ratio.
Note that each ¿rm’s output is also a function of total non-agricultural output, \?, which could
reÀect the presence of agglomeration economies or other external effects. In order to retain a standard
treatment of competitive equilibrium, we assume that each ¿rm is small enough to disregard its effect
on total output. We write total non-agricultural output as:
\? @
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For simplicity, we will take i+=, to be Cobb-Douglas, given by i+=,@N
￿




? . Then output in non-agriculture is
\? @^ N?`￿E￿nb￿^D?kO?`E￿3￿￿E￿nb￿ (5)
where the key parameter  captures the magnitude of agglomeration effects. For example  @3 =6
implies that if all non-agricultural ¿rms simultaneously increase their use of capital and labor by 10
percent, total non-agricultural output would rise by 13 percent (from 4=4￿￿￿  4=46). The presence of
increasing returns means that labor productivity depends on the scale of the sector.
Another way to judge assumptions about  is to observe that we can use equation (5) to derive an








This means that  can be interpreted as the elasticity of labor productivity in non-agriculture with
respect to non-agricultural employment, holding the capital-labor ratio constant. For example, if  @
3=6, thenfortwocountries withthesamecapital-laborratio innon-agriculture(andthesametechnology
and human capital) a country that has 43( more non-agricultural employment than the other will have
6( higher labor productivity in non-agriculture.
We now discuss our treatment of human capital. From the perspective of calibrating the model
for individual countries, our decision to augment labor in both sectors by the same skills factor, k,i s
equivalent to merely changing the scale of the productivity terms D@ and D?. Nevertheless, we choose
to include an explicit role for human capital at this stage, because cross-country variation in skills will
inÀuence our later calculations of international variation in measures of productivity.
7The model is completed by specifying equilibrium conditions. We assume that capital is perfectly
mobile between sectors, so that rental rates are equalized.8
u? @ u@ (6)
The second equilibrium condition applies to the labor market. Here we leave open the possibility of a
sustained wage differential:
z? @ z@+4 . , (7)
This differential could reÀect costs of migration or disutility from urban life, or perhaps some de-
gree of risk aversion together with a lack of informal insurance mechanisms in urban areas.9 As we
will see in calibrating the model, the data appear to imply signi¿cant intersectoral differentials under
plausible parameter assumptions. Therefore we allow such differentials to be a potential feature of the
equilibrium solution of the model. The extent of the differential will have implications for the output
gain associated with an equilibrium switch, and we explore this issue later in the paper.
An equilibrium for our model is de¿ned by an intersectoral allocation of capital and labor such that
equations (6) and (7) hold simultaneously.10 These equilibrium conditions will typically be satis¿ed
by more than one allocation of labor, and in the next section we will present conditions which indeed
ensure two interior equilibria. These different allocations will be associated with different levels of
aggregate output per worker and total factor productivity, and also with different factor shares and
returns to capital and labor.
The multiplicity property is driven by the externality in the non-agricultural sector, which yields
returns to scale that are increasing for the non-agriculture sector as a whole. Given that capital is
mobile, this externality offsets diminishing returns to labor, and there will be a range of intersectoral
laborallocations forwhich the returns to labor in non-agriculture are increasing in the numberof people
employed in the sector.
To see this more formally, note that if capital mobility ensures that rental rates are equalized,
the capital stock employed in the non-agricultural sector, N?, will be a function of non-agricultural
employment O? and the ¿xed constants  @+ >>>>N>G>O>k>D@>D ?,. Hence we can write
8The results are easily generalized to allow for a permanent differential in rental rates across sectors.
9Banerjee and Newman (1998) discuss insurance mechanisms in the context of a dual economy. Also, note that our
assumption of a ¿xed wage differential could be justi¿ed by ef¿ciency wage considerations, as in Landon-Lane and Robertson
(2000).
10There is another equilibrium where all the labor force will be engaged in agricultural production. Since this is never
observed in the data, the paper considers only interior equilibria, corresponding to incomplete specialization.
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Figure 1: INCREASING RETURNS AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
NOTES: The¿gure depictsthe laborsupply curvesfor non-agriculture,z?+O?>,,andagriculture,z@+O?>,,
respectively. Equilibria are de¿ned by the intersection of the two curves. The arrows illustrate the dynamics of
the system when labor follows a Marshallian adjustment process, where migration between sectors takes place
at a rate proportional to the current wage differential.
N? @ *+O?>, and this implies that the wage in each sector can be written as a function of O? and 
alone. In terms of an equilibrium condition,
z?+O?>,@+ 4.,z@+O?>, (8)
Hence we have reduced our two equilibrium conditions to a single equation in one unknown, namely
non-agricultural employment O?. This is one element of the strategy we will use to calibrate the model.
Figure 1 graphs the right and left-hand-sides of (8) for the case with no equilibrium wage differential
( @3 ). These lines show agricultural and non-agricultural wages as a function of non-agricultural
employment, so an equilibrium is de¿ned by the intersection of these two curves. The ¿gure illustrates
the case where the curves intersect twice, corresponding to the presence of two interior equilibria. This
is the usual case in our model, as we will discuss later in the paper.
We end our description of the model with an important digression, on the relevance of dynamics to
our empirical analysis. In calibrating the model, we will not specify a mechanism for capital and labor
movements away from equilibrium. Essentially we will be comparing outcomes under alternative,
static equilibria. Consideration of the dynamics remains relevant, however. Depending on the form
of the adjustment mechanisms for capital and labor, one of the equilibria may be locally unstable, and
9thus unlikely to be observed in practice.
We have established that local stability for both the interior equilibria is a possible outcome, given
a suitably speci¿ed intersectoral labor migration process. This is a surprising result since standard
approaches to stability analysis – for example positing a Marshallian adjustment process with  @3
as depicted in Figure 1 – would imply that the ¿rst interior equilibrium is unstable.11 This is not true,
however, in the presence of a permanent wage differential (A3) even under Marshallian dynamics,
provided there is a ¿xed cost of switching sectors.12 There will be a range of wage differentials which
are insuf¿cient to cover the ¿xed cost, and this will create a sphere of stability around both of the
equilibria depicted in Figure 1.
Wecanalso showlocalstability ofboth interiorequilibriainthecontextofafullyspeci¿edmigration
model, based upon rational and forward-looking decisions. To do this, we build on an insight of Howitt
and McAfee (1988). Local stability of the ¿rst interior equilibria can be obtained when, in addition to
the positive externality emphasized above, a small ‘crowding diseconomy’ is introduced. The crowd-
ing diseconomy means that the cost of intersectoral labor migration is increasing in non-agricultural
employment. This can be thought of as a simple way to capture a plethora of negative external effects
associated with industrialization and urbanization – higher housing costs, increased commuting times,
lower environmental quality – that could make cities, and therefore non-agricultural employment, less
attractive as industrialization proceeds.13
Since the details of our stability analysis are not essential to grasping the main ideas of the paper
- although essential to making them rigorous - we leave a full treatment to Appendix 1. We should
note, however, that an explicit speci¿cation for the intersectoral labor migration process tends to imply
that the equilibrium wage gap, , is endogenously determined. Since allowing for this would lessen
the ease and transparency of the calibration exercise, we will choose to calibrate the simpler model
b a s e do na¿xed wage ratio. The approximations involved are unlikely to be important. Our informal
experimentation suggests that the results are robust to extending the model to include an endogenous
wage gap, driven by a speci¿c migration process.
We should also note the relevance of recent work on equilibrium ‘robustness’ in a stochastic context.
Frankel and Pauzner (2000) analyze a two sector model with increasing returns, based on Matsuyama
(1991), in which opportunities to migrate arrive as a Poisson process. They show that if the relative
11This feature is familiar from related models in the literature, including Panagariya (1981), Diamond (1982), Ethier
(1982a, 1982b), Krugman (1991), and Matsuyama (1991).
12We are grateful to Michael Kremer for this observation.
13The interaction of agglomeration economies and crowding diseconomies in the determination of city size is one theme
in the new economic geography. See Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).
10payoff to working in a particular sector is stochastic, the multiplicity property may be eliminated, given
certain properties of the sequence of shocks. They also note, however, that this conclusion has not
been established for more general migration processes. A similar consideration applies to the work of
Herrendorf et al. (1999), who show that suf¿cient heterogeneity of agents will lead to uniqueness in
models like that of Matsuyama (1991). These are all important contributions, but since their generality
is not yet clear, we think it remains of great interest to study models that retain the multiplicity property.
Another result in the multiplicity literature is that the introduction of persistent noise into a determin-
istic system of differential equations typically leads to a re¿nement in the set of observable equilibria
(Foster and Young 1990). Often, one of the deterministic equilibria will be more robust to persistent
perturbation than others, suggesting it is more likely to be observed in the long run. At ¿rst glance,
this appears to cast some doubt on the empirical relevance of multiplicity. The ergodicity introduced
by adding noise to a dynamic system, however, is essentially an asymptotic result, especially if the
noise in the system is small relative to the deterministic Àow. Again, we do not see this argument as
general enough to rule out all consideration of multiple equilibria, and even a multiplicity result based
on deterministic dynamics retains considerable interest.
3 Calibration strategy
This section now describes our strategy for calibrating the model. Throughout, we will use d to denote
agriculture’sshareofemployment, asobservedinthedata, andvto denote agriculture’s share of output,
again as observed in the data.
As with many applications of calibration, we assume that we observe the world in equilibrium. More
speci¿cally, we assume that the employment and output shares observed in our data correspond to one
of the possible equilibrium allocations. The innovative aspect of our approach is that we can then solve
for alternative equilibrium allocations in a way that greatly restricts the need for parameter assumptions
and data, and thus makes the calibration exercise relatively straightforward and transparent. Although
the assumption that we observe the world in equilibrium is a strong one, we have experimented with
calibration methods that allow for simple forms of disequilibrium, and our results are generally robust
to these alternative assumptions.
Given the observed sectoral structure, we use the assumption of intersectoral capital mobility to
solve for the sectoral allocations of capital that are compatible with equilibrium. This allows us to
reduce the equilibrium conditions (6) and (7) to a single non-linear equation. Given our assumption
that the observed data correspond to one equilibrium solution, this equation depends upon only the
11technology parameters (>>>) and the agricultural output and employment shares. We can then
solve this equation numerically to identify all those labor allocations that satisfy the requirements for
equilibrium. These solutions will include, by construction, the observed equilibrium allocation, but
also any additional allocations consistent with equilibrium.
The key advantage of our approach is that it circumvents the need for data on such hard-to-measure
variables as the capital stock, total employment and sectoral productivity levels. Initially this may seem
counter-intuitive, but we can brieÀy illustrate the underlying principle by returning to the simple one-
factor model described at the start of section 2. We indicated that, in the simple model, any interior
equilibrium allocation of labor (with agricultural employment share d) must satisfy:






Denote the left-hand side as j+=,. Any other equilibrium allocation (which we denote as e) must satisfy
an equation of the same form:






Combining the above two equations means that we can write an equation directly relating the observed
employment share, d, to the alternative equilibrium allocation, e:
j+d,@j+e,
Hence we do not need to know anything about D@, D?,o rO to derive the alternative equilibrium
allocation of labor. Instead, all we need to know is the form of the equation j+=, and the value of the
employment share found in the data, d.
This principle carries over directly to the more complex model that forms the basis for our calibra-
tion, and to which we now return. As before, we seek to reduce the theoretical model to one equation
and one unknown, where the unknown is the alternative solution for an equilibrium employment share,
e, given the observed employment share, d. Appendix 2 shows that our model implies:
j+d,@j+e, (9)













Appendix 2 also shows that, under the parameter restriction






12there will almost always be two solutions to (9).14 One of these solutions will be the observed agri-
cultural employment share, d. The other solution will be the other possible equilibrium allocation of
labor, e.
How can we distinguish whether a given country is in a low output or high output equilibrium?
The most obvious method is to solve (9) numerically and compare the alternative solution, e,w i t h
the observed employment share, d. Appendix 2 derives another method, assuming that the parameter
restriction above holds. The method is based on a comparison between the assumed value of the
externality parameter, , and a critical value W de¿ned as:
W @















This critical value is speci¿c to each country, since it varies with the employment and output
shares (d and v). A country for which ? W is in its high output equilibrium. Conversely, A W
corresponds to a low output equilibrium. If  @ W, a knife-edge case, there is only one equilibrium.
The number of countries found to be in a low output equilibrium will vary positively with the as-
sumed extent of increasing returns (captured by ). The intuition for this is straightforward. The
stronger the external effect, the more worthwhile it is to allocate labor to the non-agricultural sector,
other things equal. Hence, as  increases, a ‘good’ equilibrium will correspond to a greater proportion
of labor allocated to non-agriculture. Loosely speaking, when the externality parameter takes relatively
high values, there are fewer countries for which the observed allocation of labor to non-agriculture is
suf¿ciently extensive for the country to be in a high output equilibrium. We can make this statement
more rigorous by noting that our condition for a high output equilibrium, ? W, can be rewritten as a
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(12)
As the externality parameter  increases, the country-speci¿ct h r e s h o l ddW will fall for each country,
and hence there will be fewer countries for which the agricultural employment share is low enough to
indicate a high output equilibrium.
As well as assigning countries to equilibria, our framework allows us to compute the ratio of output
in the alternative equilibrium to that in the current equilibrium. Appendix 2 shows that this ratio is









































As this equation makes clear, one advantage of the simplicity of our model is that we can quantify
the output effects of equilibrium switching very easily. We require only data on the agricultural output
and employment shares, combined with a small number of parameter assumptions.
4 Data and assumptions
In this section, we brieÀy describe the data and parameter assumptions that will be required to calibrate
the model. In assigning each country to a low or high output equilibrium, we require data on agricul-
ture’s share of employment and value added (d and v in our notation). These data are taken from the
World Development Indicators CD-Rom 2000, supplemented with other sources where necessary. We
will also use data from Hall and Jones (1999), and data on the stock of agricultural land from the FAO
Yearbook, when examining international differences in total factor productivity later in the paper. The
full data set is described in more detail in Appendix 3.
For the three technology parameters, we choose  @3 =68,  @3 =73 and  @3 =53.W e h a v e
based the value for the non-agricultural capital share, , on the aggregate capital share often used in
growth accounting (see for example Collins and Bosworth 1996). Our ¿gures for the capital and labor
shares in agriculture ( and ) are similar to those used in the GTAP global trade project described in
Hertel (1997), which has drawn together data on factor shares from a variety of countries. We have
also examined the factor shares implicit in the Martin and Mitra (2001) estimates of a CRS translog
production function for agriculture. Their estimates, based on data from the mid-1960s to the present,
yield factor shares similar to those adopted here. Later in the paper we will investigate how the ¿ndings
vary with alternative choices for >and .
One partial check that our parameter assumptions are plausible is to consider their implications for
the aggregate labor share. The aggregate labor share will be simply the sectoral labor shares weighted
by the shares of each sector in output. Since our production functions are Cobb-Douglas and factors
14receive their marginal products, the aggregate labor share is:
 @ v+4    ,.+ 4 v,+4 ,
In our data set, the value of the agricultural output share, v,r a n g e sf r o m3=6( to 9<=6(,w i t ham e d i a n
of 48=:(. This implies that the aggregate labor share, under our parameter assumptions, will vary
between around 7;( in the most agricultural countries to around 98( in the least agricultural, with a
median of about 94(.
The ¿nal parameter to consider is , which captures the strength of the external effect in non-
agricultural production. Given its likely importance to the results, we will report calibration results
based on a wide range of values. Using data on the manufacturing sector in the US and Europe, Ca-
ballero and Lyons (1992) ¿nd external economies large enough to be consistent with a value for  of
roughly 0.20 to 0.30. Our view that external economies may be this important is also given some sup-
port by the empirical work in Backus et al. (1992) for a cross-section of countries between 1970 and
1985. Similarly, the analysis of trade Àows by Antweiler and TreÀer (2000) suggests that increasing
returns play a prominent role in about a third of goods-producing industries. Their evidence is poten-
tially consistent with the presence of industry-wide externalities, although other effects may also be at
work.
Overall, however, we should acknowledge that the evidence for strong external effects is mixed.
Burnside (1996) argues that much of the existing evidence is unreliable, for a variety of reasons. The
discussion in Benhabib and Farmer (1996, pp. 434 - 435) surveys a wide range of estimates of external
effects, some of which are smaller than those identi¿ed by Caballero and Lyons. This is not necessarily
a major concern for the present paper, however. Benhabib and Farmer note that aggregation is likely
to be associated with stronger increasing returns than found in some of the more disaggregated studies
they discuss. More fundamentally, one of the main contributions of the analysis below is to show that
even low values for  can generate interesting results.
5 Multiple equilibria: some basic welfare results
We now calibrate the model for each of 127 countries as observed in 1988, where the sample is that
of Hall and Jones (1999).15 Under the maintained assumptions of our model, we can derive both of
the possible equilibrium allocations of labor, where two exist. We can infer the nature of a country’s
15All the calibration experiments were implemented using a program written in Mathematica that is available from the
authors on request.
15equilibrium, low output or high output, and calculate the ratio of output in the high equilibrium to that
in the low. We can also assess the potential contribution of multiplicity to international variation in
output levels, and explore the implications of the model for the world distribution of income.
In our ¿rst set of results, we directly address the question posed in the title of our paper: how much
of the international variation in output per worker levels can multiple equilibria explain? To answer
this question, we compute summary measures of the cross-country inequality in output per worker.
We use inequality measures that are decomposable, so that after dividing our sample of countries into
two groups, those in a low and those in a high output equilibrium, we can then decompose the sources
of inequality into its ‘within-group’ and ‘between-group’ components. Note that the assignment of
countries to one group or the other, and hence the inequality decomposition, will vary with the assumed
degree of increasing returns in non-agriculture.
We carry out the inequality decompositions based on two different summary measures of inequal-
ity in output per worker. The ¿rst measure is a decomposable ‘Generalized Entropy’ index, due to
Shorrocks (1980), with a parameter value of 2. This measure is equal to one-half of the coef¿cient
of variation squared, and so has a simple relation to the variance. The second measure we use is the
familiar Theil index of inequality.
These two decompositions are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1, for ¿ve different values
of . The within-group fraction, corresponding to the proportion of inequality due to the within-group
dispersion in the data, is denoted ‘
U +(,. The between-group fraction, corresponding to the proportion
of overall inequality due to differences in income levels between those countries in a low output equi-
librium and those in a high output one, is denoted ￿
U +(,. The between-group component provides an
upper bound on the extent of the cross-country inequality in output per worker that might be attributed
to multiple equilibria.
The results from this exercise are quite dramatic. For the highest values of  that we examine, we
can assign more than half of the inequality in living standards to differences in output levels between
those countries in a low output equilibrium and those in a high output one. Even for a value of 
as low as 3=38, our inequality decompositions assign 4; to 5; percent of international inequality to
between-group differences.
It is essential to note, however, that income levels may vary across low and high equilibrium coun-
tries for reasons other than the low or high nature of their current equilibrium. Countries in a low output
equilibrium will typically have other characteristics that lead to low output per worker. In this case our


















 @3 =38 ;4=<4 ; =4: 5 =35 ; =3 3=479
 @3 =43 :3=85 < =88 : =87 5 =8 3=586
 @3 =53 94=76 ; =97 < =<8 3 =4 3=6<6
 @3 =63 86=<7 9 =47 7 =:8 8 =6 3=7;4
 @3 =83 78=<8 7 =46 < =<9 3 =4 3=8<6
Table 1: MULTIPLICITY AND THE DISPERSION OF INCOME LEVELS
NOTES: Columns (1) and (2) report inequality decompositions where the level of output per worker is parti-
tioned into a within-group component (Z
L +(,) and a between-group component (E
L +(,). The two comparison
groups are low equilibrium and high equilibrium countries respectively. The decomposition is performed using a
‘Generalized Entropy’ measure for inequality with a parameter equal to 2 (see Mookherjee and Shorrocks 1982)
and for the Theil coef¿cient. The former measure is identical to one-half the cof¿cient of variation squared and
thus has a familiar variance interpretation. Column (3) takes a different approach to quantifying the impact of
multiple equilibria on the world distribution of income and reports one minus the ratio of the hypothetical vari-
ance in the log of output per worker that would be observed if all countries were in their high output equilibrium
over the actual variance.
17To address this problem, column (3) reports an alternative experiment. First, we compute the vari-
ance in the logarithm of output per worker across countries. Next, we ‘force’ all countries in a low
output equilibrium into their alternative, high output equilibrium, calculate the associated increase in
output, and then recalculate the variance for this hypothetical or counterfactual distribution. We can
then examine the ratio ofthe two variances, to estimate the reduction in cross-country variation in living
standards that we would observe if all countries were to switch to their high output equilibrium.
Even under this new approach, for a value of  of 3=53 we can explain around two-¿fths of the
internationalvarianceinlogoutputperworker, simplybyappealingtomultiplicity. Notethatincontrast
to our ¿rst approach, this method probably underestimates the amount of variation due to multiple
equilibria. This is because it ignores some dynamic or general equilibrium effects that might follow an
equilibrium switch, like capital accumulation and increases in schooling.
Next, we ask a closely related question. What would the world distribution of income look like,
if all countries were in a high output equilibrium? It has been suggested by Quah (1993, 1997) and
Jones (1997) that the world income distribution may be bimodal, or at least tending towards that form.
Calibration allows us to investigate the extent to which this feature might be attributed to multiplicity.
The exercise should be seen as only illustrative, especially since for simplicity, we do not model the
general equilibrium effects that operate at the level of the world as a whole.16 Nevertheless, examining
the impact of multiplicity on the world income distribution may be informative, and is particularly
useful in allowing us to indicate where in the distribution ‘poverty traps’ may have the greatest impact.
Figure 2 plots kernel density estimates for the actual distribution of output per worker (the solid line)
and for a selection of our hypothetical distributions, generated by placing all countries in their high
output equilibrium. As is apparent from the ¿gure, the ‘poverty traps’ implied by our model are most
frequentlyfoundamongtheverypoorestcountrieswithinthedistribution. Ourparticularmodelappears
best suited to explaining income differences between the least developed countries and middle income
countries, rather than differences between middle income countries and the industrialized nations. To
put this in more concrete terms, the model we have calibrated may offer some partial insight into why
incomes in Africa are low, but it has much less to say about the current positions of Latin American
and East Asian economies relative to the industrialized countries. This may or may not be a general
feature of calibrated models with multiple equilibria, but it does show one respect in which calibration
can help to explore the properties of these models.
A remaining question is the size of the output effects associated with a switch between equilibria.
16The simpli¿cation here is to treat world prices as ¿xed throughout. In principle, we should allow world prices to vary as
patterns of sectoral structure change.
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Figure 2: MULTIPLICITY AND THE WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME (DENSITY ESTIMATES)
NOTES: This ¿gure graphs kernel density estimates for the actual distribution of the logarithm of output per
worker across countries and for the hypothetical distribution that would occur if all countries were in their high
output equilibrium for the case where  equals 0.10 and 0.20. Bandwidth selection is by the plug-in method of















 @3 =38 54 +49=8(, 439 +;6=8(, 4=88@4=64 4=;8@4=:<
 @3 =43 66 +59=3(, <7 +:7=3(, 4=:3@4=86 4=;5@4=:5
 @3 =53 77 +67=9(, ;6 +98=7(, 5=36@4=:3 4=:5@4=95
 @3 =63 89 +77=4(, :4 +88=<(, 5=53@4=:7 4=9;@4=86
 @3 =83 9: +85=;(, 93 +7:=5(, 5=9<@5=44 4=8:@4=7:
Table 2: THE WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
NOTES: The table reports the distribution of equilibrium assignments for various values of . Columns (3)
and (4) report the mean and median inter-equilibrium output ratios for countries assigned to low and high output
equilibria respectively.
It is clear that, to be of practical interest, a theoretical model of multiplicity should yield equilibria
that greatly differ in terms of output per worker. Table 2 offers some insight into this question for our
model. We consider ¿ve cases, again corresponding to different values of the externality parameter .
We focus on columns (1) and (2) initially. They report the number of countries found to be in a low
and high output equilibrium respectively. Even with a limited role for the agglomeration externality
( @3 =43)w e¿nd that roughly a quarter of the countries in our sample are found to be in the low
output equilibrium. With a stronger external effect, the proportion of countries assigned to the low
output equilibrium increases, as predicted by the analysis above.
In column (3), we report the mean and median output ratio across the high and low equilibria for
countries found to be in a low output equilibrium. Column (4) does the same for countries found to be
in a high output equilibrium. From the table, we can see that if low equilibrium economies switched
to their higher equilibrium (column 3) then output per head would rise by a factor roughly between 1.5
and 2.7, for the values of the externality parameter that we consider here.17 The median output gain is
similar to the mean, so output gains of this magnitude are not unrepresentative.
It is worth noting that the output gains reported in column (3) are likely to be underestimates. In
analyzing the output effect of an equilibrium switch, we are holding everything else constant. We
would ¿nd higher output gains if we were to make physical capital endogenous. Similarly, growing
17There are two inÀuences on this output gain: the external effect, and the differential in the marginal product of labor
across sectors. We will examine this issue further in section 8 below.
20expenditure on education could also play a role in magnifying the effects of an equilibrium switch.
While these are substantial output gains, they again underline the conclusion implicit in Figure 2
above. Our model seems to have the greatest power in explaining differences between the low end and
the middle of the distribution. This conclusion is consistent with the idea that poverty trap models are
best at illuminating the transition to ‘modern economic growth’ (in the sense of Kuznets 1966) rather
than the differences between, say, the US and middle income countries.
6 Multiple equilibria and aggregate TFP
In this section, we explore the implications of our model for understanding international differences in
total factor productivity(TFP). Thelikely extentofthesedifferences isone ofthemostdebatedtopicsin
recent work on growth. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) initiated this debate by arguing that aggregate
TFP should bebroadly similar acrosscountries, since it should bepossible to transfertechnology across
national borders at low cost. More recently, several inÀuential papers have criticized this view, claiming
that substantial differences in aggregate TFP are needed to explain the observed variation in output per
worker across countries (Hall and Jones 1999, Klenow and Rodriguez-Claré 1997, and Prescott 1998).
Subsequent research has consequently focused on developing coherent theoretical explanations for
these TFP differences (see for example Acemoglu and Zilibotti 2001, Basu and Weil 1998, and Caselli
and Coleman 2000).
In this section, we will show that our approach may have important implications for this debate.
In our framework, it is possible that much of the measured international variation in aggregate TFP
may reÀect the presence of multiple equilibria. Consider two countries identical in all respects, with
the exception that one is in a low output equilibrium while the other is in a high output equilibrium.
The ‘levels accounting’ of, for example, Hall and Jones (1999) will identify a difference in total factor
productivity across the two countries. This TFP difference may be incorrectly attributed to a difference
in technology, when in fact it arises through multiple equilibria.
To investigate this further, we will compare the cross country dispersion of a standard measure of
aggregate TFP with the dispersion that would be observed if all countries were in their high output
equilibrium.18 We will show that a model with multiple equilibria, of the kind analyzed here, can
indeed account for a signi¿cant fraction of the international variation in productivity.
18Although our two sector model allows a more sophisticated decomposition of output differences, based on measure-
ment of productivity at the level of the two sectors, here we concentrate on the aggregate decompositions favored by most
researchers.
21For comparison with previous work on TFP differences, we will take into account international
differences in human capital. Our adjustments are identical in form to those of Hall and Jones (1999).
The basic idea is to construct units of ‘effective’ labor that are compatible with the Mincerian wage
regressions of labor economics. We de¿ne k @ h￿E.￿,w h e r e!+H, is the ef¿ciency of a worker with
H years of schooling relative to a worker with no schooling. The form of !+=, is piecewise linear
as constructed and parameterized by Hall and Jones (1999). For simplicity, we assume that workers
in agriculture and non-agriculture are equally well educated, so the total amount of human capital-
augmented labor in sector l is then kO￿,w h e r el @ q>d.
We calculate aggregate TFP using Törnqvist comparisons between individual countries and the
world mean (Christensen, Cummings and Jorgenson 1981). To make these comparisons, we use the
aggregate factor shares implied by our model. Let uc￿, -c￿ and gc￿ be the aggregate income shares
for labor, land, and capital in country l. Under the assumptions of our model, it is easily shown that
these shares are equal to:
uc￿ @ v￿+4    ,.+ 4 v￿,+4  , (14)
-c￿ @ v￿ (15)
gc￿ @ v￿ .+ 4 v￿, (16)
where v￿ is agriculture’s share of output in country l. We then compute a measure of the logarithm of
aggregate TFP relative to its world mean:





























where the line over a variable indicates an average over the countries in our sample.
To obtain the counterfactual distribution of TFP, we force all countries into their high output equilib-
rium, recalculate (14) to (16) using the new sectoral structure of value added, and then recalculate the
deviation of country l’s logarithm of TFP from the logarithm of the world mean using equation (17).
Table 3 shows the results for various assumptions about the externality parameter, = According to
our model, up to around 30 percent of the observed variation in the logarithm of aggregate TFP can
be given a multiple equilibria interpretation. Figure 4 gives a visual depiction of the cross-country
distribution of aggregate TFP and the impact of multiple equilibria on this distribution. The solid line
22+4,





 u  (  g
TFP (Actual) 3=567  3=933 3=373 3=693
TFP ( @3 =38) 3=533 47=8 3=93; 3=367 3=68;
TFP ( @3 =43) 3=4:: 57=4 3=947 3=35< 3=68:
TFP ( @3 =53) 3=499 5<=4 3=955 3=355 3=689
TFP ( @3 =63) 3=49< 5:=9 3=95; 3=34; 3=687
TFP ( @3 =83) 3=536 46=4 3=968 3=345 3=686
Table 3: MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND THE WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF TFP
NOTES: The table lists the variance of the log of aggregate TFP (Column (1)). TFP is calculated using Chris-
tensen, Cummings and Jorgenson’s (1981) method for the actual data and for the hypothetical data created by
placing all countries in their high output equilibrium. The percentage of the variance due to multiple equilibria
(Column (2)) is then calculated as 1 minus the ratio of the hypothetical variance of TFP to the actual variance of
TFP. Column (3) reports the average factor shares implied by our model for the actual and hypothetical data.
is a kernel density estimate for the actual distribution of the logarithm of TFP, while the two dashed
lines are density estimates for the hypothetical distributions when  @3 =43 and  @3 =63 and all
countries are in their high output equilibrium.
As is apparent from the ¿gure, allowing for multiple equilibria leads to a tightening of the aggregate
TFP distribution. In principle this could be one way to reconcile international TFP differences with the
view that technology can be transferred easily across national borders. Yet even for large values of ,
there is suf¿cient remaining variation in TFP that this ‘public good’ view of technology continues to
look slightly problematic.
We end this section by noting that we could also use our framework to investigate productivity
measures at the level of sectors (D? and D@ in our notation). Given the structure of our model, these
are the most appropriate measures of the level of ‘technology’ used by a given country. One attractive
feature of our calibration exercise is that we can easily compute an estimate of productivity for both the
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, and we are exploring this in ongoing research.
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Figure 3: AGGREGATE TFP MEASURES
NOTES: Kernel density estimates for the actual distribution of aggregate TFP across countries and a selection
of the counterfactuals discussed in the text. Bandwidths were chosen using Sheather and Jones’ (1991) plug-in
method. The kernel is a univariate standard normal density function.
247 Equilibrium switching
One way to establish the relevance of ‘poverty trap’ models would be to isolate events in the data that
could represent a switch between equilibria. In this section, we show how calibration can be used for
this purpose. We also provide a speculative analysis of the future changes in the world distribution of
income that are implied by our framework.
By calibrating our model for two points in time – we choose 1965 and 1988 for data availability
reasons – we can determine which countries exhibited patterns of structural change over the period that
are consistent with a shift from a low output equilibrium to a high output one. The model indicates that
a switch has occurred when the 1988 values of the employment and output shares imply an equilibrium
different in nature (high output or low output) from that of 1965.19
Table 4 lists a few selected countries by major world region for each of the observed events in the
data: (1) a movement from the low to high output equilibrium over the 1965 to 1988 period, (2) staying
in the low output equilibrium over the period, and (3) staying in the high output equilibrium. A fourth
possibility, movement from a high to low equilibrium, is not observed in our sample, a result which we
discuss further below.
Even under the relatively conservative assumption that  @3 =43 our model can account for some
interesting features of the data. First, the few African ‘success stories’ can be given an equilibrium
switching interpretation, as can the growth experiences of parts of southern Asia. For this parameter
assumption, however, our model says little about the causes of the East Asian growth miracle. The
calibration exercise indicates that all of this region’s fast growing economies – with the exception of
Indonesia – were already in their high output equilibrium in 1965.
This result is, perhaps unsurprisingly, sensitive to our choice for . Table 5 provides a similar list
of countries for the case where  @3 =63. Under this parameter assumption we are able to interpret
the East Asian miracle as equilibrium switching, with the exception of the growth performances of the
two city states, Hong Kong and Singapore. We are also able to explain some of the more robust Latin
American growth performances, including that of Brazil.
In addition, this exercise allows us to compute a transition matrix for movement between the low
and high output equilibria. Using this transition matrix we can examine the possible evolution of the
19Note that simply looking at the change in the employment share will not work. Over time capital accumulation and
technical progress have taken place, so even if the change in the employment share appears to imply an equilibrium switch,
this may not be the case. Our earlier analysis shows that the current output share is also needed to infer the nature of a
country’s equilibrium.


















































Table 4: EQUILBRIUM DYNAMICS, 1965 TO 1988 + @3 =43,
NOTES: The model is calibrated in 1965 and 1988 for  @3 =43 and equilibrium assignments for individual
countries are compared across the two points in time to derive the above table. No countries went from their
high equilibrium to their low equilibrium during the sample period. Unfortunately the value added data cannot
be adjusted to net out mining output in 1965, therefore unadjusted data is used across both periods. We are able
to do the two point calibration for 121 of the 127 countries in the main sample.


















































Table 5: EQUILBRIUM DYNAMICS, 1965 TO 1988 + @3 =63,
NOTES: The model is calibrated in 1965 and 1988 for  @3 =63. For other notes see Table 4.









Table 6: TRANSITION MATRIX FOR EQUILIBRIUM SWITCHING
NOTES: Transition matrix generated from the two point (1965 and 1988) calibration (n = 121). Note that the
high output equilibrium appears to be an absorbing state.
world distribution of income in the long run, in a way familiar from previous work on this topic (Quah
1993, Jones 1997, and Kremer, Onatski and Stock 2001).
Table 6 reports our calculation of the transition matrix for movements between equilibria. The
calculation is based on observed equilibrium switches between 1965 and 1988, again for the cases
where  is assumed to be 3=43 and 3=63. There are two properties of the calculated matrix that are
worthy of note. First, the low output equilibrium is relatively persistent: the probability of exiting
over more than twenty years is only about 30% for both the cases considered. Second, the high output
equilibrium appears to be an absorbing state. Once a country enters its high output equilibrium it stays
there permanently. This second feature of our results is similar to the ¿nding of Kremer, Onatski and
Stock (2001) that departures from the upper regions of the world distribution of income are relatively
rare. For those interested in the possibility of multiplicity, such ¿ndings are of especial interest in their
suggestion that equilibrium selection may rest on more than expectations.
Table 7 reports the fraction of countries in their low and high output equilibria in 1965 and 1988,
and uses our transition matrix to project these fractions into the future. Our results suggest that, again
for the case of  @3 =43> in 1965 almost 73 percent of the world’s countries were in a low output
equilibrium by 1988 this had fallen to a quarter. In principle, the transition matrix implies that by the
middle of this century, less then 43 percent of the world’s economies will remain in their low output
equilibrium.
These calculations are, of course, subject to a number of important caveats even if we make the
heroic assumption that our model is a good approximation to reality. The projections rely on the past
transition process being a good guide to the future. There are many reasons for skepticism here. The
probability that an individual country makes an equilibrium switch is likely to be a function of that
country’s characteristics. This would imply that our forecasts for mid-century are over-optimistic,
perhaps wildly so, since countries with the greatest capacity to reach their high output equilibrium will
be the ones that have already done so.
28THE EVOLUTION OF THE WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
 @3 =43
1965 1988 2011 2034 2057 ERGODIC
Percent in Low 37.2 25.6 17.6 12.2 8.4 0.0
Percent in High 62.8 74.4 82.4 87.8 91.6 100.0
 @3 =63
1965 1988 2011 2034 2057 ERGODIC
Percent in Low 64.5 43.0 28.7 19.1 12.7 0.0
Percent in High 35.5 57.0 71.3 80.9 87.3 100.0
Table 7: THE DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTRIES ACROSS EQUILIBRIA
NOTES: The world distribution of countries across the low and high output equilibria. The percentages for
1965 and 1988 are “actuals” while the other values are derived by exponentiating the transition matrix.
Clearly, none of these speci¿c results should be taken too seriously. Nevertheless, they are indicative
of how calibration could inform the debate on the potential relevance of multiplicity for understand-
ing the growth process. In particular, calibration helps to identify the countries for which a multiple
equilibrium interpretation is most likely to have some plausibility, and so can help in selecting indi-
vidual cases for further study. The exercise also con¿rms that more informal discussions of the role of
multiple equilibria, as in the work of Rodrik (1995, 1996) on the East Asian Miracle, are potentially
consistent with the data under the maintained assumptions of our model.
8 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we provide some brief sensitivity analysis, to indicate how particular results are modi-
¿ed by alternative parameter assumptions. The ¿rst part of the section investigates how the apparent
prevalence of poverty traps will vary with assumptions on the technology parameters , ,  and .
The second part of the section will investigate the sensitivity of our results to variation in the marginal
product differential across sectors.
We earlier indicated that the assignment of countries to a low output or high output equilibrium can
be achieved by comparing the assumed external effect  with a country-speci¿c critical value W,g i v e n
by:
W @

























































































Figure 4: ROBUSTNESS TO DIFFERENT PARAMETER ASSUMPTIONS
NOTES: This ¿gure illustrates the importance of our assumptions regarding >> and  for equilib-
rium assignment. Reading across from the top-left: Panel 1:  and  held ¿xed at 0.35 and 0.20. Panel 2:  and
 held ¿xed at 0.35 and 0.40. Panel 3:  and  held ¿xed at 0.40 and 0.20. Panel 4:  and  held ¿xed at 0.20
and 0.30.
the higher the  parameter, the higher the critical value for each country. This means that there will
be fewer economies for which A W and so fewer economies will be found to be in a low output
equilibrium.
By differentiating W with respect to  and , it is also possible to establish conditions under which
W is decreasing in  and increasing in . These conditions, however, are functions of the three tech-
nology parameters (, , ) and also the agricultural employment and output shares, d and v,a n ds o
must be evaluated using the data. The conditions are satis¿ed for almost every single country in our
data set when evaluated at our assumed parameter values, but cannot be assumed to hold more broadly.
30For this reason, we investigate the sensitivity of our ¿ndings to parameter assumptions using graphi-
cal methods. The four panels of Figure 4 show the proportion of countries that are found to be in a low
output equilibrium for various con¿gurations of parameters. From the top-right panel, it is clear that
the proportion of countries found to be ‘trapped’ is increasing in  and decreasing in , exactly as our
theoretical analysis predicts. The other panels show the more complex patterns associated with varying
the other technology parameters, ,  and , in each case holding one constant and varying the other
two.
The second aspect of our sensitivity analysis is more subtle. Earlier sections of the paper quanti¿ed
the output gain associated with an equilibrium switch. The size of this output gain depends on the size
of the externality parameter, but also on the magnitude of the wage differential across sectors. This
marginal product differential reinforces the effect of reallocating labor to non-agriculture, in moving
from a low output equilibrium to a high output equilibrium.
One drawback of our simple model is that plausible values for technology parameters yield large
intersectoral wage differentials. One probable explanation is that, in reality, the non-agricultural sector
makes more intensive use of skilled labor than agriculture. Allowing for this is not straightforward
within the framework of this paper, but it does raise the concern that our previous analysis overstates
the true extent of marginal product differentials, and therefore overstates the output effects of an equi-
librium switch.
In the remainder of this section, we explore the sensitivity of our results to this property of the
model. To do this, we use a simple trick that allows lower wage differentials to be considered while
retaining our other assumptions. The trick is to assume that a certain fraction of agricultural output, ,
is unmeasured in the national accounts. Some agricultural output may be produced for non-marketed
household consumption, and so does not appear in the national accounts as either output or factor
income. Under various assumptions about the magnitude of , we adjust agriculture’s share in GDP for
this mismeasurement, and then recalculate the equilibrium solutions and the associated welfare effects.
Animportantadvantageofthisapproachisthatithasastraightforwardeffectonthewagedifferential
implicitinour calculations. Since weare using Cobb-Douglas production functions, marginalproducts,
and hence wages, are proportional to average products. Since assuming  @3 =8 implies that ‘true’
average labour productivity in agriculture is double that in the unadjusted data, it will halve the ratio of
wages in non-agriculture to agriculture that is implicit in our calculations.
Theadjustmentsareeasily made. We denotetrue agricultural outputas \ W
@ an dm ea s ur e da gr i cu l tu r al
output as \@ @+ 4 ,\ W
@ . Hence true output is \ W @ \ W
@ .s\? andmeasuredoutputis\ @ \@.s\?.




















 @3 =33 58=65 9 =3: 7 =34 =:3 4=;5
 @3 =43 57=:5 9 =3: 7 =34 =9: 4=:7
 @3 =53 57=45 9 =;: 6 =54 =94 4=99
 @3 =63 56=65 ; =6: 4 =:4 =87 4=8;
 @3 =73 55=65 ; =6: 4 =94 =7< 4=7;
 @3 =83 53=<6 3 =:9 < =64 =74 4=6<
Table 8: ROBUSTNESS OF MAIN RESULTS TO MIS-MEASURED AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
NOTES: Column (1) reports the ratio of the hypothetical variance of the log of GDP per worker when all
countries are in their high output equilibrium to the actual variance for various assumptions regarding the degree
to which agricultural output is undermeasured. Columns(2) and(3) showhowequilibriumassignment is affected
by mis-measurement, while columns (4) and (5) show how average output gains are affected.
the ‘true’ or adjusted output shares vW @ \ W
@ @+\ W




4   . v
Using this result, we adjust the output share data for various possible values of  and then recalculate
some of our earlier statistics. The results are shown in Table 8 for the case of  @3 =43. The quantity
of most interest is the output gain in switching between the low and high equilibria. As  is increased
from the benchmark case of accurate measurement ( @3 ) the effect of an equilibrium switch on output
diminishes, consistent with the reductions in the wage differential that are implicit in these calculations.
Yet the reductions in the output gain are relatively modest, implying that our earlier results are not
driven simply by large marginal product differentials across sectors.
9C o n c l u s i o n
Although models with multiple equilibria are a popular explanation for the gulf between rich and poor
nations, few papers have attempted to investigate the practical implications of such models. In this
paper, we have sought to address this omission by using calibration. We take as our starting point one
32of the simplest models with multiplicity, a two sector model with a sector-speci¿ce x t e r n a l i t y .W eh a v e
shown how to calibrate such a model in a way that greatly limits the need for parameter assumptions
and data. In turn, this means that calibrating the model even for 127 countries is a relatively simple
procedure.
This exercise gives rise to a number of interesting ¿ndings. Sections 5 and 8 established that, de-
pending on the choice of parameters, a large number of countries might be regarded as in a low output
equilibrium, under the maintained assumptions of our model. We also found that multiple equilibria
can potentially account for a substantial fraction of the international inequality in output per worker.
The account is by no means a complete one, however. Holding all else constant, a switch to a more
productive equilibrium will roughly double output, with the precise ¿gure depending on the strength
of the externality. This is a substantial gain, but falls a long way short of explaining the difference
between, say, the US and India. To put this another way, if we were to attempt to choose parameters
in such a way that we could explain most of the international variation in living standards, the model
would require an implausibly strong degree of increasing returns in non-agriculture.
We were able to shed additional light on the model’s implications by constructing a ‘counterfactual’
world distribution of income. Our calibration exercise allows us to calculate the output levels that
would prevail if all countries were in their high output equilibrium. As we showed in section 5, this
makes most difference to the very poorest countries. The particular model we calibrated can explain
some of the gap between poor countries and middle income countries, but is much less well suited to
explaining the gap between middle income countries and the richest nations.
By calibrating the model for two different points in time, 1965 and 1988, we can also identify
events in the data that correspond to equilibrium switching under the maintained assumptions of our
model. Thus, calibration may be particularly useful in identifying particular countries where rapid
growth might correspond to a switch between two equilibria. We have also been able to clarify the
implications of multiplicity for the debate on international differences in total factor productivity.
Inevitably, some of our ¿ndings are speculative. The model we have used is a simple one, and the
underlying assumptions are strong. One assumption in particular stands out: the quantitative impli-
cations of our model crucially depend on the size of the externality parameter. The evidence on the
importance of sector-speci¿c externalities is mixed and, although even small external effects can give
rise to interesting ¿ndings, the lack of reliable supporting evidence must be seen as a limitation of the
approach we have adopted. More generally, although our calibration exercise offers some useful insight
into the properties of the model we analyze, it does not provide a formal test of its validity. Nor do
we provide an explanation for why countries arrive at particular equilibria. For all these reasons, we
33are keen to emphasize that our investigation of multiplicity is currently far too preliminary to draw any
lessons for policy.
Nevertheless, we think it is intriguing that even a simple model can give rise to such wide-ranging
implications. By applying calibration methods, we have learnt a great deal about the potential explana-
tory power of the model, and its strengths and limitations. Calibration appears to be one of the most
promising ways forward for research on multiple equilibria. We hope that future researchers will be
encouraged to explore these ideas further, and perhaps to bring richer models to the data.
10 Appendix 1: Stability analysis
This appendix outlines a speci¿cation for the dynamics which implies that both interior equilibria are
locally stable. It also brieÀy discusses the approximation involved in our use of a simpler model for
calibration purposes.
In specifying the dynamics, we retain the assumption that capital costlessly moves between sectors
to equalize rental rates, but now assume that labor migration is costly. In particular, migration costs
are described by a convex cost function, F+ b O?>O ?,,w h e r eF￿ A 3>F ￿￿ A 3> and F+3>O ?,@3 .
Migration costs arealso increasing inthe total amount of labor employed in non-agricultural production
due to crowding diseconomies (i.e., F2 A 3 and F￿2 A 3).
Therepresentative individual chooses the levelofmigration, b O?, to maximize the present discounted
value of income net of migration costs:






\@ .\?  F+ b O?>O ?,
l
g (18)
where  is the discount rate. Since the representative individual is not a social planner she does not take
into account the presence of the agglomeration externality in the non-agricultural sector when choosing
the optimal migration path neither does she internalize the externality generated by the crowding
diseconomy in F+,.
We characterize the solution to the sequence problem de¿ned by (18) using a dynamic program-
ming argument. From the envelope theorem, and the fact that the representative individual does not
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34where t is equal to the market value of having an additional unit of labor in non-agriculture instead
of agriculture that is, the expected net present value of future wage premia that an individual realizes
from migrating.
To derive a continuous time Bellman Equation we begin with the discrete time optimality condition:
Y +O?,@p d {
t ￿ u?￿
k
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(20)
The ¿rst order condition for optimal migration is:
F￿+ b O?>O ?,@t (21)
Migrants therefore equate marginal moving costs with the net present value of expected wage premia
from switching sectors. Inverting (21) yields the optimal migration rate:
b O? @ F3￿
￿ +t>O?, (22)
Migration is increasing in the discounted expected stream of future wage premia, t. Optimal behavior,
or rationality, also imposes constraints on the path of t over time. Differentiating (19) with respect to
time yields:
t @ z?  z@ .b t (23)
The cost of staying in the non-agricultural sector, t, equals the current wage premium, z?  z@,
plus “capital gains” or increases in the expected value of future wage premia, b t. Equation (23) makes
explicit the importance of expectations regarding future wage paths on migration behavior. Positive
migration from agriculture to non-agriculture may occur, even if such a movement is associated with
an instantaneous wage loss, when the long run gains from switching sectors are expected to be high.
To evaluate the local stability properties of the dynamic system de¿ned by (22) and (23) we linearize
the system around a steady state. For simplicity consider the case where F+, takes a quadratic form
35such that F+ b O?>O ?,@4 @5￿+ b O?,2 .+ 4 @52,+O? . i, b O?> where i represents ¿xed moving costs.
We can then rewrite (22) as:
b O? @ ￿t 
￿
2
+O? . i, (24)











The roots of the linearized system ()￿>)2)a r ed e ¿ned by wu+D,@)￿ .)2 and ghw+D,@)￿)2.As u f ¿-
cient condition for local stability of all equilibria is therefore ?
#￿
#2.20 The interaction of expectations,
increasing returns, and a small crowding diseconomy can result in local stability of all interior equi-
libria if individuals are suf¿ciently patient (small ) or the crowding diseconomy is relatively strong
(small 2).
A set of representative dynamics for the system de¿ned by (23) and (24) are depicted in Figure
5. The dynamics of the system can be quite complex, but all our empirical exercise requires is local
stability of the two interior equilibria. This is a suf¿cient condition for both equilibria to be observable
under occasional perturbation. For a more detailed discussion of the interaction between expectations
and stability in the context of increasing returns, see Howitt and McAfee (1988), Krugman (1991),
and Matsuyama (1991). Graham (2000) provides an extensive discussion in the context of the present
model.
We now brieÀy discuss the implications of this analysis for the equilibrium wage gap. The dynamics
for O? and t described by (23) and (24) imply that in equilibrium, the intersectoral wage gap will equal
z?  z@ @

2
+O? . i, (26)
In contrast, the model we calibrate is based on a simpler equilibrium condition, namely that the wage
ratio is the same for both equilibria. Hence we must think of our calibrated model as only an approxi-
mation to the one analyzed here, with its more complete speci¿cation of the migration process.
In the more complete model, equation (26) shows that the wage gap between sectors is greater in
the high output than in the low output equilibrium. This is potentially compatible with our calibration
assumption that the wage ratio is ¿xed across equilibria. Since wages are greater in the high output than
in the low output equilibrium, a ¿xed wage ratio corresponds to a wage gap that is greater in the high
output equilibrium.
20Saddle-stability holds when _e|E 	 f, which holds at the high output equilibrium, but not the low output equilibrium.











































Figure 5: EXPECTATIONS AND EQUILIBRIUM STABILITY
NOTES: The¿gure depictsthemigrationdynamicsfor thesystem de¿nedbythesystemofdifferential equations
(24) and (23). The ¿gure illustrates that under our fully speci¿ed migration process both of the interior equilibria
are locally stable and thus observable under occasional perturbation. However, our migration model also gives
rise to local indeterminacy, generating multiple perfect foresight paths for any given initial labor allocation.
11 Appendix 2: Calibration
This appendix shows how to derive an expression that an alternative equilibrium factor allocation must
satisfy, and thus forms the basis for our calibration exercise. It also sketches a proof that there will be
at most two equilibria, under a parameter restriction described below, and provides a simple method
for distinguishing whether an observed economy is in a low or high output equilibrium.
In what follows, we denote the fraction of total capital allocated to agriculture in the observed equi-




? are the agricultural and non-agricultural output levels associated with the
alternative equilibrium, if one exists. The derivation starts from the payment of private marginal prod-
ucts to capital and labor:
















We substitute the expressions for wages into the labor market equilibrium condition (7), which im-
plies:












This indicates that we can express the ratio of value added in the two sectors as a function of the


















This equation demonstrates that the intersectoral wage differential +z?@z@ @4., is a function of
the technology parameters and the observable variables d and v.
An equation of this form must also hold in any alternative equilibrium with incomplete specializa-
tion. For this alternative equilibrium, we use y to denote agriculture’s share of value added, and e the



































Next we derive an equation for the proportion of capital allocated to agriculture, {,i nt h eo b s e r v e d














v .+ 4 v,
(36)
where the last line uses marginal productivity factor pricing (so that uN@@\@ @ , see equation 28)
and the identity that holds for the aggregate capital share (uN@\ @ v .+ 4 v,).
38Once again, if there is an alternative equilibrium with incomplete specialization, the fraction of


































The system of equations is completed by making use of the production functions, to write down
the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural output for both possible equilibria. Using our sectoral
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Thenext stepisto usethe twoequationsforthe intersectoralcapital allocations ({and})t oe l im in a te
































which can be expressed as equation (9) in the text.
39This has reduced the system to one equation and one unknown, e. The solutions represent all the al-
locations of labor that satisfy the equilibrium conditions, one of which will be the observed equilibrium
labor allocation d. The underlying intersectoral capital allocations are easily recovered using equations
(35) and (37).
We now investigate the number of equilibria, and also provide a simple way to distinguish whether
an observed economy is in a low output or high output equilibrium. We start by rewriting (41) as:
j+d,@j+e, (42)













This equation must be satis¿ed by all equilibrium allocations of labor with incomplete specialization.
We now show that under the parameter restriction






there will be at most two equilibria with incomplete specialization.
The underlying idea of the proof can be gained by considering a plot of orjj+d, and orjj+e, against
all the potential values of e,t h a ti sf o re 5 +3>4,. An example is shown in Figure 6. Clearly orjj+d,
is a horizontal line since the quantity d is ¿xed by the data. The intersections of orjj+e, with this
horizontal line correspond to the possible equilibrium employment allocations, since at these points
j+d,@j+e,. Note also that j+3, @ 3 and j+4, @ 3.
H e n c eas u f ¿cient condition for there to exist at most two solutions between zero and one is that the
curve orjj+e, should be strictly concave. This implies that orjj+e, crosses the straight line orjj+d,
twice at most, for values of e where 3 ?e?4.
To show strict concavity of orjj+e,, we will use (42) to write:
j+e,@eq +4  e,
b ^4  en`
w (44)





@ and  @   +4 . ,. Note that our parameter restriction (43) can be
rewritten as  . A3 and 3 ?n . Also, since d> v>  and  all lie between zero and one, then n?4.
If A3 then it is easy to show that the logarithm of (44) is strictly concave. We now show that this








40Figure 6: ON THE NUMBER OF EQUILIBRIA
NOTES: An example sketch of log g(a), the horizontal line, and log g(b), the curve. This sketch indi-
cates that there will be at most two interior equilibria under strict concavity of log g(b).
and so:





.+  . ,orj+4  en, (45)
Since the sum of strictly concave functions is strictly concave, all we need to show is that each
of the three terms in (45) is strictly concave. For the ¿rst term, this is obvious by inspection. It is
straightforward toshow that the ¿nal termisalso strictlyconcave (noting that.A3by assumption).
















and this implies that the second term is also strictly concave in e, given our assumption that 3 ?n?4.
This completes our sketch of the proof that, under the parameter restriction (43), there will be at most
two equilibria with incomplete specialization.
We can also use this result to infer from the observed employment and output shares whether an
economy is in its best available equilibrium or one with lower output. The key idea is that for an
observed economy to be in its high output equilibrium, the leftmost intersection in the ¿gure, the
derivative of j+=, with respect to e should be greater than zero when evaluated at d.C o n v e r s e l yi ft h e
41derivative is less than zero when evaluated at d, the economy must be in a low output equilibrium.
There is also a knife- e d g ec a s ew h e r ejK+d,@3  given strict concavity of orjj+=, this implies that
there is only one equilibrium.
We can use this idea to generate a condition that the externality parameter () must satisfy for a
given economy’s sectoral structure to correspond to a high output equilibrium. The derivative of j+=,













Since dn ? 4 and therefore jA3, the sign of jK+d, can be evaluated from the bracketed term alone.
Substituting infor  andn, and rearranging, wecan rewritethecondition that jK+d, A 3asthe condition
that ? W, where the critical value W is given by:
W @















This is the critical value discussed at several points in the main text.
We now turn to the welfare effects associated with equilibrium switching, by showing how to calcu-
late the ratio of output in the alternative equilibrium to that in the current one. Here we use e to denote




















































Substituting in the expressions for } and { and simplifying yields the output ratio associated with an
equilibrium switch, equation (13) in the text.
42References
[1] Acemoglu, Daron and Fabrizio Zilibotti (2001). “Productivity differences,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 116 (2): 563 - 606.
[2] Antweiler, Werner and Daniel TreÀer (2000). “Increasing returns and all that: a view from trade,”
NBER Working Paper No. 7941.
[3] Azariadis, Costas (1996). “The economics of poverty traps Part One: complete markets,” Journal
of Economic Growth, 1 (4): 449 - 486.
[4] Azariadis, Costas (2001). “The theory of poverty traps: what have we learned?”, Manuscript,
UCLA.
[5] Backus, David K., Patrick J. Kehoe and Timothy J. Kehoe. (1992). “In search of scale effects in
trade and growth,” Journal of Economic Theory 58 (3): 377 - 409.
[6] Banerjee, Abhijit and Andrew F. Newman. (1998). “Information, the dual economy, and develop-
ment,” The Review of Economic Studies 65 (4): 631 - 653.
[7] Basu, Susanto and David N. Weil. (1998). “Appropriate technology and growth,” Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 113 (4): 1025 - 1054.
[8] Benhabib, Jess and Roger E. A. Farmer. (1996). “Indeterminacy and sector-speci¿c externalities,”
Journal of Monetary Economics 37 (3): 421 - 443.
[9] Burnside, Craig. (1996). “Production function regressions, returns to scale, and externalities,”
Journal of Monetary Economics 37 (2): 177 - 201.
[10] Caballero, Ricardo and Richard K. Lyons. (1992). “The case for external economies,” Political
Economy, Growth, and Business Cycles (A. Cukierman et al, Eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[11] Caselli, Francesco and John Wilbur Coleman II. (2000). “The world technology frontier,” CEPR
Discussion Paper No. 2584.
[12] Christensen, Laurits R., Dianne Cummings, and Dale W. Jorgenson (1981). “Economic growth,
1947 - 1973: an international comparison,” European Economic Review 16 (1): 61 -9 4 .
[13] Collins, Susan and Barry Bosworth. (1996). “Economic growth in East Asia: accumulation versus
assimilation,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 0 (2): 135 -1 9 1 .
43[14] Diamond, Peter A. (1982). “Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium,” Journal of
Political Economy 90 (5): 881 -9 4 .
[15] Durlauf, Steven N. and Paul A. Johnson. (1995). “Multiple Regimes and Cross-Country Growth
Behaviour,” Journal of Applied Econometrics 10 (4): 365 -8 4 .
[16] Durlauf, Steven and DannyT. Quah(1999). “The NewEmpirics ofEconomic Growth,” (J. B. Tay-
lor & M. Woodford, Eds.). Handbook of Macroeconomics. New York: Elsevier Science, North-
Holland.
[17] Ethier, Wilfred J. (1982a). “National and international returns to scale in the modern theory of
international trade,” American Economic Review 72 (3): 389 - 405.
[18] Ethier, Wilfred J. (1982b). “Decreasing costs in international trade and Frank Graham’s argument
for protection,” Econometrica 50 (5): 1243 - 1268.
[19] Foster, Dean and Peyton Young (1990). “Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics,” Theoretical
Population Biology 38 (2): 219 - 232
[20] Frankel, David and Ady Pauzner (2000). “Resolving indeterminacy in dynamic settings: the role
of shocks,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (1), 285 - 304.
[21] Fujita, Masahisa, Paul Krugman and Anthony J. Venables. (1999). The Spatial Economy: Cities,
Regions, and International Trade. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[22] Graham, Bryan S. (2000). Poverty Traps and the World Economy. M.Phil Thesis, Oxford Univer-
sity.
[23] Hall, Robert E. and Charles I. Jones. (1999). “Why do some countries produce so much more
output per worker than others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1): 84 -1 1 6 .
[24] Herrendorf, Berthold, Ákos Valentinyi and Robert Waldmann (2000). “Ruling out multiplicity
and indeterminacy: the role of heterogeneity,” Review of Economic Studies 67 (2): 295 - 307.
[25] Hertel, Thomas W. (1997). Global Trade Analysis: Modelling and Applications. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
[26] Howitt, Peter and R. Preston McAfee. (1988). “Stability of equilibria with externalities,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 103 (2): 261 - 277.
[27] Jones, Charles I. (1997). “On the evolution of the world distribution of income,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives 11 (3): 19 - 36.
44[28] Klenow, Peter J. and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare. (1997). “The neo-classical revival in growth eco-
nomics: has it gone too far?” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997 (B.S. Bernanke & J.J.
Rotemberg, Eds.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
[29] Kremer, Michael, Alexei Onatski and James Stock. (2001). “Searching for prosperity,” NBER
working paper no. 8250.
[30] Krugman, Paul. (1991). “History versus expectations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (2):
651 - 667.
[31] Krugman, Paul. (1995). Development, Geography, and Economic Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
[32] Kuznets, Simon (1966). Modern economic growth. Yale University Press, New Haven.
[33] Landon-Lane, John S. and Robertson, Peter E. (2000). “Post war industrialization and growth:
what can a Lewis type model explain?” Manuscript, University of New South Wales.
[34] Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer and David N. Weil. (1992). “A contribution to the empirics of
economic growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (2): 407 - 437.
[35] Martin, Will and Devashish Mitra. (2001). “Productivity growth and convergence in agriculture
and manufacturing,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 49 (2): 403 -4 2 2 .
[36] Matsuyama, Kiminori. (1991). “Increasing returns, industrialization and indeterminancy of equi-
librium,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (2): 617 -6 5 0 .
[37] Mookherjee, Dilip and Anthony F. Shorrocks. (1982). “A decomposition analysis of the trend in
UK income inequality,” Economic Journal 92 (368): 886 - 902.
[38] Murphy, Kevin M., Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny. (1989). “Industrialization and the big
push,” Journal of Political Economy 97 (5): 1003 - 1020.
[39] Myrdal, Gunnar. (1957). Economic Theory and Under-developed Regions. London: Duckworth.
[40] Nurkse, Ragnar (1953). Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries. New York:
Oxford University Press.
[41] Pangariya, Arvind. (1981). “Variable returns to scale in production and patterns of specialization,”
American Economic Review 71 (2): 221 - 230.
[42] Prescott, Edward C. (1998). “Needed: A theory of total factor productivity,” International Eco-
nomic Review 39 (3): 525 - 551.
45[43] Quah, Danny. (1993). “Empirical cross-section dynamics in economic growth,” European Eco-
nomic Review 37 (2-3): 426 - 434.
[44] Quah, Danny (1997). “Empirics for Growth and Distribution: Strati¿cation, Polarization, and
Convergence Clubs,” Journal of Economic Growth 2 (1): 27 -5 9 .
[45] Rodriguez-Clare, Andres. (1996). “The Division of Labor and Economic Development,” Journal
of Development Economics 49 (1): 3 -3 2 .
[46] Rodrik, Dani. (1995). “Getting interventions right: how South Korea and Taiwan grew rich,”
Economic Policy 0 (20): 53 -9 7 .
[47] Rodrik, Dani. (1996). “Coordination failure and government policy: a model with applications to
East Asia and Eastern Europe,” Journal of International Economics 40 (1-2): 1 - 22.
[48] Romer, Paul. (1986). “Increasing returns and long-run growth,” Journal of Political Economy 94
(5): 1002 - 1037.
[49] Rosenstein-Rodan, P.N. (1943). “Problems with industrialization of Eastern and South-eastern
Europe,” Economic Journal 53 (210/211): 202 -2 1 1 .
[50] Sheather, S.J. and M.C. Jones. (1991). “A reliable data-based bandwidth selection method for
kernel density estimation,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B, 53 (3), 683 - 690.
[51] Shorrocks, Anthony F. (1980). “The class of additively decomposable inequality measures,”
Econometrica 48 (3): 613 - 625.
[52] Solow, Robert. (1956). “A contribution to the theory of economic growth,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 70 (1): 65 -9 4 .
46